Sudanese Army Captures Al-Mazroub as Offensive Pushes West Towards Darfur
2 October 2026 – Al-Mazroub, North Kordofan, Sudan
The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), supported by allied armed groups, captured the strategically important town of Al-Mazroub in North Kordofan on 2 October 2026, forcing the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) to withdraw from one of their principal remaining positions in the state. The capture represented another significant advance in the government's campaign to recover territory lost during Sudan's civil war, which began in April 2023.
Al-Mazroub, the administrative centre of West Bara locality, lies approximately 90 kilometres west of Bara and occupies an important position on the routes connecting North Kordofan with West Kordofan and the western region of Darfur. Its capture followed several weeks of government advances across northern and western North Kordofan, during which the army and its allies recovered numerous towns, settlements and transport routes previously controlled by the RSF.
The Sudanese military announced that its forces had taken control of Al-Mazroub following heavy fighting, claiming to have inflicted substantial casualties on RSF personnel and destroyed or captured a number of military vehicles. Mohammed Deidan, spokesman for the army's special forces, confirmed the takeover and described the operation as an important development in the campaign to sever the RSF's supply routes. However, the military did not publish detailed casualty figures or an independently verifiable inventory of equipment losses.
The precise circumstances of the town's capture remained uncertain. Although the army described fierce fighting, local sources subsequently reported that RSF fighters had withdrawn following relatively limited clashes. Mutawakkil Ali Wakil, a spokesman for the Joint Force supporting the army, stated that government-aligned troops had entered Al-Mazroub after the RSF pulled back to positions outside the town. These accounts suggested that the final takeover may have involved considerably less fighting than indicated in the military's official announcement.
The presence of government-aligned forces was nevertheless independently established. Videos circulated following the operation showed Sudanese soldiers and members of the Joint Force inside Al-Mazroub, including personnel outside the town's central courthouse. The footage was geolocated by Sudan War Monitor, confirming that government forces had entered and occupied important parts of the settlement. Other recordings showed soldiers celebrating alongside local residents. The verified footage established the territorial change, although it did not substantiate the army's claims concerning the scale of the fighting or RSF losses.
The capture formed part of a wider offensive that had gathered momentum during the summer of 2026. In July, government forces recovered Bara, Jabra al-Sheikh, Umm Sayalla and several other settlements along the Al-Sadarat Highway, also known as the Western Salvation Road. Reopening this transport corridor strengthened communications between the government-held capital region and El Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan, while reducing the RSF's ability to operate across the northern approaches to the city.
The campaign accelerated in September. On 17 September, the Sudanese military announced the recovery of eleven areas in North Kordofan, including Kajmar, Sharshar, Al-Baniyah Al-Kurayniyah, Al-Qulay'at, Awlad Hazmah and several other settlements and surrounding districts. The advances brought government forces closer to Al-Mazroub and threatened RSF positions across a broad section of the northern Kordofan front.
On 25 September, the army and its allies captured Sodari, another important town that had served as an operational base for RSF forces in northern North Kordofan. The loss of Sodari placed additional pressure on the paramilitary organisation and reduced its capacity to maintain a continuous network of positions across the region. The subsequent capture of Al-Mazroub, approximately one week later, suggested that the government offensive was continuing to dislodge RSF units rather than merely recovering isolated settlements.
The geographical importance of Al-Mazroub extended beyond the town itself. Kordofan occupies a central position between Sudan's eastern and central regions, where the regular army has regained control of extensive territory, and Darfur, where the RSF continues to maintain its principal military strongholds. Control of the roads and desert tracks crossing Kordofan is therefore essential to the movement of troops, ammunition, fuel and other supplies. By occupying Al-Mazroub, the army gained a position from which it could threaten routes used by RSF formations operating between North Kordofan and the western provinces.
Military officials presented the advance as an important step towards cutting RSF supply lines and opening the way into West Kordofan. The claim had a clear strategic basis, although possession of a single town did not mean that the entire network of desert routes had been severed. The RSF retained the ability to move through other areas under its control, and the effectiveness of the government's advance would depend upon whether its forces could secure surrounding territory, maintain their own supply routes and prevent further RSF counterattacks.
Despite the government's gains, the RSF had not been eliminated from North Kordofan. Following the fall of Al-Mazroub, the paramilitary organisation continued to hold territory around Umm Badr and Hamrat al-Sheikh in Sodari locality. Other RSF units remained west of El Obeid, particularly around Abu Qa'ud and Umm Sumaima, while additional positions were maintained south of the city near Kazgil. Although the government controlled most of the state's principal administrative centres, substantial areas remained contested.
The newly captured positions also raised the possibility of further government operations against RSF forces west of El Obeid. Troops advancing southwards or southwestwards from northern North Kordofan could potentially place these formations under pressure from more than one direction, particularly if combined with operations launched from the state capital. Such movements might force the RSF to abandon additional positions, redeploy troops or divert resources from other fronts. Nevertheless, further advances were not inevitable, and the paramilitary organisation continued to possess substantial forces elsewhere in Sudan.
Al-Mazroub also carried considerable local significance. The town is associated with the Majanin tribe and had previously attracted national attention following a deadly drone strike in October 2025. The attack struck a gathering of tribal leaders and killed Prince Suleiman Jaber Jumaa Sahl, the paramount chief of the Majanin, together with sixteen other people. The incident occurred shortly after the tribal leader had reportedly called upon RSF fighters to leave the town. Both parties to the civil war accused the other of responsibility for the strike, and the competing allegations were not conclusively resolved.
The occupation of Al-Mazroub consequently represented more than a change in military positions. For the local population, the arrival of government forces marked another reversal of authority in a region repeatedly affected by armed conflict, displacement and disruption to civilian life. The Sudanese military encouraged residents of recaptured areas to resume their normal activities and promised to protect civilians and property. However, the restoration of effective administration, public services and secure transport routes remained dependent on the wider security situation.
The battle took place against the background of a civil war that had divided Sudan for more than three years. The conflict began on 15 April 2023 after a power struggle between General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, commander of the Sudanese Armed Forces, and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, commonly known as Hemedti, leader of the Rapid Support Forces. Both men had previously exercised considerable influence over the country's government, but disagreements over the future organisation of Sudan's security forces developed into open warfare.
The RSF initially seized extensive territory, including large parts of Khartoum and areas across western and central Sudan. The regular army subsequently recovered the capital in March 2025 and consolidated its control over much of the country's central and eastern regions. As the conflict continued, the main territorial confrontation increasingly shifted towards Kordofan, where government advances threatened the routes connecting RSF-controlled Darfur with the rest of Sudan.
The fighting has produced one of the world's most severe humanitarian emergencies. Millions of Sudanese have been driven from their homes, while the destruction of infrastructure, interruption of food supplies and collapse of essential services have exposed large sections of the population to hunger, disease and insecurity. Repeated changes in territorial control have also complicated humanitarian access, leaving civilian communities dependent upon unstable transport links and relief operations.
The capture of Al-Mazroub on 2 October 2026 therefore marked an important stage in the Sudanese army's campaign to regain control of North Kordofan. Coming shortly after the recovery of Sodari and numerous smaller settlements, it demonstrated the extent to which the military balance in the northern part of the state had shifted in favour of the government. Nevertheless, the RSF retained positions around El Obeid, continued to control extensive territory farther west and remained capable of contesting the government's advance.
The wider significance of the operation would depend upon whether the Sudanese Armed Forces could exploit their territorial gains, secure the approaches to West Kordofan and place sustained pressure on the RSF's communications with Darfur. Although Al-Mazroub had fallen, the conflict in Sudan remained far from concluded, and control of the country's western regions continued to be fiercely disputed.
